Cuban Missile Crisis - Wikipedia
What struck me is that a year after the Cuban missile crisis, we were negotiating the first real nuclear agreement with the Russians, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of . The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of (Spanish: Crisis de . After the transmission of nuclear missiles, Khrushchev had finally. After waging a successful guerrilla war against the regime of Cuban dictator As US-Cuban relations deteriorated, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for support. The origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis lie in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.
A New Threat to the U. For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.
From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.
The Soviets had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U. The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island—the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in —and Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a means of deterring further U.
Weighing the Options From the outset of the crisis, Kennedy and ExCom determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The challenge facing them was to orchestrate their removal without initiating a wider conflict—and possibly a nuclear war. In deliberations that stretched on for nearly a week, they came up with a variety of options, including a bombing attack on the missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ultimately decided on a more measured approach.
Colman draws on documents from archives across the world to place the missile crisis in its wider international and chronological context. GeorgeMunton and Welchand White are well suited to undergraduates, as is the political science classic Allison and Zelikow originally published in Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow.
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Updated version of a political science standard, presenting three theoretical models for understanding what went on.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
The Cuban Missile Crisis: Origins, Course and Aftermath. Edinburgh University Press, One Minute to Midnight: Khrushchev was also reacting in part to the nuclear threat of obsolescent Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles that had been installed by the US in Turkey in April Another major reason why Khrushchev placed missiles on Cuba was to level the playing field.
Before this event, America had the upper hand as they could launch from Turkey and destroy USSR before they would have a chance to react. After the transmission of nuclear missiles, Khrushchev had finally established mutually assured destruction.
Mutually assured destruction means that if America decided to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, the latter would react by launching a nuclear strike against America. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire".
Prior to this, there was no clear barrier to how the United States was willing to react, and with new president John F. Kennedy, it was unknown to the Soviet Union to what they can do to manipulate the United States.
By placing missiles on Cuba, next to the doorstep of the United States, it would be clear to the extent of which the United States would react. They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.
According to another source, Castro objected to the missiles deployment that would have made him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp. By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba.
Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans "with more than words From the very beginning, the Soviets' operation entailed elaborate denial and deceptionknown as " maskirovka ". Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment.
The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Seaand Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.CNN - Cold War 10/24 Cuba 1959-1962
He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian-built MiG fighters and Il light bombers.
The Cuban Missile Crisis - International Relations - Oxford Bibliographies
CIA director John A. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, "made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. He charged the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the US, thereby starting the crisis. The R was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead.
I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.
The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles.
Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could turn.
Cuban Missile Crisis - HISTORY
The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese -operated U-2   was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the "Photo Gap. US officials attempted to use a Corona photoreconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence.
When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery.