Marcus Licinius Crassus - Wikipedia
Marcus Licinius Crassus was one of the leading Roman businessmen and politicians in the late While it is true that Crassus is not exceptional as Pompey and Caesar, he is not an individual Caesar had a good relationship with Crassus. From Africa Pompey demanded that a triumph be given him in Rome; he with Caesar, and now proposed to ally himself by marriage to the party of the Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar formed the unofficial and at first secret “First Triumvirate. Crassus was one of the richest men in Rome during the time Caesar was Crassus and his #1 political enemy in Rome, Pompeius Magnus.
And now, when the multitude drawn up to resist the passage of Crassus, and to abuse him, saw Pompey's beaming countenance in front of him, they were mollified, and gave way before them in silence. But Ateius, on meeting Crassus, at first tried to stop him with words, and protested against his advance; then he bade his attendant seize the person of Crassus and detain him.
The Romans say that these mysterious and ancient curses have such power that no one involved in them ever escapes, and misfortune falls also upon the one who utters them, wherefore they are not employed at random nor by many. With what was left of his forces, however, he hurried on by land through Galatia. And finding that King Deiotarus, who was now a very old man, was founding a new city, he rallied him, saying: On his arrival, things went at first as he had hoped, for he easily bridged the Euphrates and led his army across in safety, and took possession of many cities in Mesopotamia which came over to him of their own accord.
The city was called Zenodotia by the Greeks. For its capture he allowed his soldiers to salute him as Imperator, thereby incurring much disgrace and showing himself of a paltry spirit and without good hope for the greater struggles that lay before him, since he was so delighted with a trifling acquisition.
This was thought to be the first blunder which Crassus committed, — after the expedition itself, which was the greatest of all his blunders, — because, when he should have advanced and come into touch with Babylon and Seleucia, cities always hostile to the Parthians, he gave his enemies time for preparation. For he made no estimate of the number of his troops, and instituted no athletic contests for them, but reckoned up the revenues of cities, and spent many days weighing exactly the treasures of the goddess in Hierapolis, and prescribed quotas of soldiers for districts and dynasts to furnish, only to remit the prescription when money was offered him, thereby losing their respect and winning their contempt.
For as they were leaving her temple, first the youthful Crassus stumbled and fell at the gate, and then his father fell over him. They said that if the army had been sent out by the Roman people, it meant war without truce and without treaty; but if it was against the wishes of his country, as they were informed, and for his own private gain that Crassus had come up in arms against the Parthians and occupied their territory, then Arsaces 28 would act with moderation, would take pity on the old age of Crassus, and release to the Romans the men whom he had under watch and ward rather than watching over him.
But from the cities of Mesopotamia in which the Romans had garrisons, certain men made their escape at great hazard and brought tidings of serious import.
For they had been fully persuaded that the Parthians were not different at all from the Armenians or even the Cappadocians, whom Lucullus had robbed and plundered till he was weary of it, and they had thought that the most difficult part of the war would be the long journey and the pursuit of men who would not come to close quarters; but now, contrary to their hopes, they were led to expect a struggle and great peril.
Therefore some of the officers thought that Crassus ought to call a halt and reconsider the whole undertaking. Among these was Cassius, 30 the quaestor. But Crassus paid no heed to them, nor to those who advised anything else except to press forward. These were said to be the king's guards and couriers; but he promised ten thousand mail-clad horsemen besides, and thirty thousand footmen, to be maintained at his own cost.
- First Triumvirate
- Pompey the Great
Crassus was tolerably well pleased with the king's zeal and with the splendid reinforcements which he offered, but said he should march through Mesopotamia, where he had left many brave Romans. Now, as Crassus was taking his army across the Euphrates at Zeugma, 31 many extraordinary peals of thunder crashed about them, and many flashes of lightning also darted in their faces, and a wind, half mist and half hurricane, fell upon their raft, breaking it up and shattering it in many places.
And one of the general's horses, richly caparisoned, violently dragged its groom along with it into the river and disappeared beneath the waves. It is said also that the first eagle which was raised aloft, faced about of its own accord.
Moreover, Crassus himself, while haranguing his men, let fall a phrase which terribly confounded them. He said, namely, that he should destroy the bridge over the river, that not one of them might return. And although he ought, as soon as he perceived the strangeness of his expression, to have recalled it and made his meaning clear to his timorous hearers, he was too obstinate to do so.
Some of his scouts now came back from their explorations, and reported that the country was destitute of men, but that they had come upon the tracks of many horses which had apparently wheeled about and fled from pursuit. Wherefore Crassus himself was all the more confident, and his soldiers went so far as to despise the Parthians utterly, believing that they would not come to close quarters.
For in this way the transports would keep them abundantly supplied with provisions by putting in at their successive encampments, and, by having the river to prevent their being surrounded, they would always fight their enemies on even terms and face to face.
For nothing was farther from the thoughts of the Parthians than to attack the Romans in front. But then he criticised him for wasting time in delays and preparations, as if it was arms that he needed, and not hands and the swiftest of feet to follow after men who had for some time been trying to snatch up their most valuable goods and slaves and fly with them into Scythia or Hyrcania.
For Hyrodes had promptly divided his forces into two parts and was himself devastating Armenia to punish Artavasdes, while he despatched Surena to meet the Romans. And though at this time he was not yet thirty years of age, he had the highest reputation for prudence and sagacity, and it was especially by means of these qualities that he also brought Crassus to ruin, who, at first by reason of his boldness and conceit, and then in consequence of his fears and calamities, was an easy victim of deceits.
Crassus sent no reply in writing, but answered at once in rage and perversity that for the present he had no time to waste on the Armenians, but that at another time he would come and punish Artavasdes for his treachery. But remember that you are traversing the border land between Assyria and Arabia. Then he changed his mind and concentrated his men, forming them in a hollow square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side. He gave one of the wings to Cassius, and one to the young Crassus, and took his own position in the centre.
Advancing in this formation, they came to a stream called Balissus, which was not large, to be sure, nor plentiful, but by this time the soldiers were delighted to see it in the midst of the drought and heat and after their previous toilsome march without water.
But Crassus was carried away by the eagerness of his son and the cavalry with him, who urged him to advance and give battle, and he therefore ordered that the men who needed it should eat and drink as they stood in the ranks.
But when they were near the Romans and the signal was raised by their commander, first of all they filled the plain with the sound of a deep and terrifying roar. They had rightly judged that, of all the senses, hearing is the one most apt to confound the soul, soonest rouses its emotions, and most effectively unseats the judgment. For the Parthians shot as they fled, and next to the Scythians, they do this most effectively; and it is a very clever thing to seek safety while still fighting, and to take away the shame of flight.
But the Parthians who were trying to envelop him, either because, as some say, they encountered marshes, or because they were manoeuvring to attack Publius as far as possible from his father, wheeled about and made off.
The cavalry followed after Publius, and even the infantry kept pace with them in the zeal and joy which their hopes inspired; for they thought they were victorious and in pursuit of the enemy, until, after they had gone forward a long distance, they perceived the ruse. For the seeming fugitives wheeled about and were joined at the same time by others more numerous still. For, in the agonies of convulsive pain, and writhing about the arrows, they would break them off in their wounds, and then in trying to pull out by force the barbed heads which had pierced their veins and sinews, they tore and disfigured themselves the more.
And when Publius urged them to charge the enemy's mail-clad horsemen, they showed him that their hands were riveted to their shields and their feet nailed through and through to the ground, so that they were helpless either for flight or for self-defence.
But his struggle was an unequal one both offensively and defensively, for his thrusting was done with small and feeble spears against breastplates of raw hide and steel, whereas the thrusts of the enemy were made with pikes against the lightly equipped and unprotected bodies of the Gauls, since it was upon these that Publius chiefly relied, and with these he did indeed work wonders.
These would rear up in their anguish, and die trampling on riders and foemen indiscriminately mingled. And seeing a sandy hillock near by, they all retired to it, and fastened their horses in the centre; then locking their shields together on the outside, they thought they could more easily defend themselves against the Barbarians. For on level ground, the front ranks do, to some extent, afford relief to those who are behind them. But here, where the inequality of the ground raised one man above another, and lifted every man who was behind another into greater prominence, there was no such thing as escape, but they were all alike hit with arrows, bewailing their inglorious and ineffectual death.
These joined in trying to persuade him to slip away with them and make their escape to Ichnae, a city which had espoused the Roman cause and was not far off. Then he himself, being unable to use his hand, which had been pierced through with an arrow, presented his side to his shield-bearer and ordered him to strike home with his sword.
The survivors fought on until the Parthians mounted the hill and transfixed them with their long spears, and they say that not more than five hundred were taken alive. Then the Parthians cut off the head of Publius, and rode off at once to attack Crassus.
After ordering his son to charge the Parthians and receiving tidings that the enemy were routed to a great distance and hotly pursued, and after noticing also that his own immediate opponents were no longer pressing him so hard since most of them had streamed away to where Publius washe recovered a little courage, and drawing his troops together, posted them for safety on sloping ground, in immediate expectation that his son would return from the pursuit.
His fear for the whole army drove him to refuse, and at the same time his yearning love for his son impelled him to grant assistance; but at last he began to move his forces forward. This spectacle shattered and unstrung the spirits of the Romans more than all the rest of their terrible experiences, and they were all filled, not with a passion for revenge, as was to have been expected, but with shuddering and trembling.
And now if ye have any pity for me, thus bereft of the noblest of sons, show it by your wrath against the enemy. Rob them of their joy; avenge their cruelty; be not cast down at what had happened, for it must needs be that those who aim at great deeds should also suffer greatly.
Then, as the enemy got to work, their light cavalry rode round on the flanks of the Romans and shot them with arrows, while the mail-clad horsemen in front, plying their long spears, kept driving them together into a narrow space, except those who, to escape death from the arrows, made bold to rush desperately upon their foes.
After fighting in this manner till night came on, the Parthians withdrew, saying that they would grant Crassus one night in which to bewail his son, unless, with a better regard for his own interests, he should consent to go to Arsaces instead of being carried there.
Cicero's speeches in favour of the supremacy of the senate made matters worse. The senate was also attacked on the ground that it did not have the right to condemn any citizens without a trial before the people. Metellus Nepos proposed a law to recall Pompey to Italy to restore order. Nepos was strongly opposed by Cato the Youngerwho in that year was a plebeian tribune and a staunch optimate. The dispute came close to violence; Nepos had armed some of his men.
According to Plutarch, the senate announced the intention to issue a final decree to remove Nepos from his office but Cato opposed it. Suetonius wrote that Caesar was suspended by a final decree. At first Caesar refused to stand down, but he retired to his home when he heard that some people were ready to coerce him by force of arms. The next day the people demonstrated in favour of his reinstatement and were becoming riotous, but Caesar "held them in check.
Caesar and Nepos forced the senate to play the role of Pompey's opponent and to resort to threaten in one case and use in the other case a final decree again — the measure whose repressive nature was at the centre of the dispute - thereby exposing it to further charges of tyranny.
Public opinion was sensitive to threats to the people's freedom and Cicero's standing deteriorated. He wanted the senate to ratify the acts of the settlements he had made with the kings and cities in the region en bloc. He was opposed by the optimates led by Lucius Licinius Luculluswho carried the day in the senate with the support of Cato the Younger. Moreover, when he took over the command of the war Pompey ignored the settlements Lucullus had already made.
Lucullus demanded that Pompey should render account for each act individually and separately instead of asking for the approval of all his acts at once in a single vote as if they were the acts of a master. The character of the acts was not known. Each act should be scrutinised, and the senators should ratify those that suited the senate. Crassus cooperated with Lucullus on this matter. However, he withdrew from public affairs.
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Those who looked on the power of Pompey with suspicion made Crassus and Cato the champions of the senatorial party when Lucullus declined the leadership. Plutarch also noted that according to some sources since Cato was the major stumbling block for his ambitions, he asked for the hand of Cato's elder niece for himself and the hand of the younger one, whereas according to other sources he asked for the hand of Cato's daughters.
The women were happy with this because of Pompey's high repute, but Cato thought that this was aimed at bribing him by means of a marriage alliance and refused. It included land that had been forfeited but not allotted by Lucius Cornelius Sulla when he distributed land to settle his veterans in 80 BC and holdings in Arretium Arezzo and Volaterrae Volterraboth in Etruria. Land was to be purchased with the new revenues from the provinces for the next five years. The optimates opposed the bill because it suspected that 'some novel power for Pompey was aimed at.
Metellus Celer had the wall cut through to let them in. When Pompey heard this he was afraid about the reaction of the people and told Flavius to desist.
Metellus Celer did not consent when the other plebeian tribunes wanted to set him free. As time went by they lost interest in the bill and by June the issue was 'completely cold.
However, he was unfamiliar with political maneuvering. In Cassius Dio 's words he "understood how to dance better than to transact any business. Appian's Version[ edit ] According to Appian, in 60 BC Caesar came back from his governorship in Hispania Spain and Portugal and was awarded a triumph for his victories there.
He was making preparations to celebrate this outside the city walls. He also wanted to be a candidate for the consulship for 59 BC. However, the candidates had to present themselves in the city and it was not legal for those who were preparing a triumph to enter the city and then go back out for these preparations.
Plutarch • Life of Crassus
Since he was not ready yet, Caesar asked to be allowed to register in absentia and to have someone to act on his behalf, even though this was contrary to the law. Cato the Younger, who was against this, used up the last day of the presentation with speeches. Caesar dropped the triumph, entered the city and presented his candidacy. Pompey had failed to get the acts for his settlements he made in the east during the Third Mithridatic War ratified by the senate.
Most senators opposed this because they were envious, particularly Lucius Licinius Lucullus who had been replaced in the command of this war by Pompey. Crassus had co-operated with Lucullus in this matter.
Plutarch's version[ edit ] Plutarch clarified that those who were granted a triumph had to stay outside the city until the celebration, while candidates for the consulship had to be present in the city. The option of registering in absentia through a friend acting on his behalf was turned down and Caesar opted for the consulship. He steered the other senators towards rejecting the proposal. In the former he added that Pompey then won the support of Caesar, who attached himself to him.
In the latter he wrote that Caesar pursued a policy of conciliating Crassus and Pompey. Therefore, the two texts seem contradictory. He told them that by concentrating their united strength on him, they could succeed in changing the form of government. He left Hispania in a hurry, even before his successor arrived, to get to Rome in time for the elections.
He sought the office before holding his triumph as it was too late to celebrate this before the elections.
He was refused the triumph through Cato's opposition. Caesar didn't press the matter, thinking that he could celebrate greater exploits if he was elected consul, and so entered the city to canvass for office. As the day of the election for the consulship had already been set, he had to register his candidacy as a private citizen and had to give up his military command and his triumph. When his intrigues to obtain an exemption caused a fuss he gave up the triumph and chose the consulship.
Caesar made entreaties to the former because he was rich and could treat the electorate with largesse. The aristocracy funded Calpurnius Bibulus for his electoral canvassing because he was a staunch opponent of Caesar, and would keep him in check. Even Cato the Younger, who was a very upright man, "did not deny that bribery under such circumstances was for the good of the republic. Normally the new consuls were assigned important areas of military command, but, in this instance, they were assigned "mere woods and pastures" -- another measure intended to blunt Caesar's ambitions.
Caesar, angry about 'this slight', tried hard to win over Pompey, who was himself aggrieved at the senate for not ratifying the settlements he made after winning the Third Mithridatic War. Caesar succeeded, patched up the relationship between Crassus and Pompey, and "made a compact with both of them that no step should be taken in public affairs which did not suit any one of the three.
His version is also the only one that mentions the woods and pastures. Convergence of interests[ edit ] Ancient sources mention what brought Pompey into the alliance, but are silent on what interests might have brought Crassus into the fold. There are only mentions of Caesar bringing Pompey and Crassus together, which Plutarch described as a reconciliation.
Cassius Dio thought that this was something that required skill—almost as if it were a reconciliation of the irreconcilable. In the writings of Suetonius and Plutarch and in some letters and a speech of Cicero, we find clues about both what the interests of Crassus may have been, and indications that Crassus and Pompey might have been less irreconcilable than their portrayals suggest and that the three men of the triumvirate had collaborated before.
It could be argued that the formation of the first triumvirate was the result of the marginalisation of an enemy Caesar and an outsider Pompey and the rebuttal of interests associated with Crassus by the optimates who held sway in the senate. A Roman bust of Lucius Cornelius Sulla in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek With respect to the aristocratic circles of the optimates who wanted the supremacy of the senate over Roman politics, Pompey was an outsider.
He built his political career as a military commander. He raised three legions in his native Picenum in central Italy to support Lucius Cornelius Sulla in retaking Rome, which had been seized by the supporters of Gaius Marius prior to Sulla's second civil war 83—82 BC.
Sulla then sent him to Sicily 82 BC and Africa 81 BC against the Marians who had fled there, where he defeated them, thereby gaining military glory and distinction, particularly in Africa. The latter two earned him the award of a consulship in 70 BC even though he was below the age of eligibility to this office and he had not climbed the cursus honorumthe political career ladder traditionally required to reach the consulship.
Pompey was also given the command of a large task force to fight piracy in the Mediterranean Sea by the Gabinian law 74 BCwhich gave him extraordinary powers over the whole of the Sea, as well as the lands within 50 miles of its coasts.
In 66 BC the Manilian law handed the command of the last phase of the Third Mithridatic War over to Pompey, who brought it to a victorious conclusion. The political power of Pompey—who spent half of his career up to 63 BC fighting outside Rome—lay outside the conservative aristocratic circles of the optimates.
It was based on his popularity as a military commander, political patronage, purchase of votes for his supporters or himself, and the support of his war veterans: The optimates were also weary of the personal political clout of Pompey. They saw him as a potential challenge to the supremacy of the senate, which they largely controlled and which had been criticized for the summary executions during the Catilinarian conspiracy.
They saw a politically strong man as a potential tyrant who might overthrow the republic. Pompey remained aloof with regard to the controversies between optimates and populares that raged in Rome at the time when he returned from the Third Mithridatic War in 62 BC. Whilst he did not endorse the populares, he refused to side with the senate, making vague speeches that recognised the authority of the senate, but not acknowledging the principle of senatorial supremacy advocated by Cicero and the optimates.
Nor was the law exclusively about allotting land for the settlement of Pompey's veterans, who expected as much ever since Sulla had done likewise in 80 BC. However, the law was framed in a way that the land would be distributed to the landless urban poor as well.
This would help to relieve the problem of the mass of the landless unemployed or underemployed poor in Rome, which relied on the provision of a grain dole by the state to survive, and would also make Pompey popular among the plebeians. Populares politicians had been proposing this kind land of reform since the introduction of the agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus in BC, which had led to his murder.
Attempts to introduce such agrarian laws since then were defeated by the optimates. Thus, the opposition to the bill sponsored by Pompey came within this wider historical context of optimate resistance to reform as well as the optimates being suspicious of Pompey. A crucial element in the defeat of the bill sponsored by Pompey was the fact what the optimates had a strong consul in Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer who vehemently and successfully resisted its enactment, while the consul sponsored by Pompey, Lucius Afraniuswas ineffective.
The lack of effective consular assistance had been a weakness for Pompey. As already mentioned above, Plutarch wrote that the defeat of the bill forced Pompey to seek the support of the plebeian tribunes, and thus of the populares. Crassus and Pompey shared a consulship in 70 BC.
Plutarch regarded this as having been dull and uneventful because it was marred by continuous disagreement between the two men. He wrote that they "differed on almost every measure, and by their contentiousness rendered their consulship barren politically and without achievement, except that Crassus made a great sacrifice in honour of Hercules and gave the people a great feast and an allowance of grain for three months.
He also forbade those who had held this tribunate from running for public office. Sulla had done this because these tribunes had challenged the supremacy of the patrician-controlled senate and he wanted to strengthen the power of the latter.
Since these tribunes were the representatives of the majority of the citizens, the people were unhappy with this. Plutarch attributed this repeal to Pompey alone. However, it is very likely that the optimates would have opposed this in the senate, making it unlikely that this measure could have been passed if the two consuls had opposed each other on this issue.
Therefore, on this issue there must have been unity of purpose among these three men. This was an issue of great importance to the populares. There are indications that Caesar and Crassus may have had significant political links prior to the triumvirate. Suetonius wrote that according to some sources Caesar was suspected with having conspired with Crassus, Publius Sulla, and Lucius Autronius to attack the senate house and kill many senators.
Crassus was then to assume the office of dictator and have Caesar named Magister Equitumreform the state and then restore the consulship to Sulla and Autronius. According to one of the sources from which Suetonius drew this information, Crassus pulled out at the last minute and Caesar did not go ahead with the plan. Suetonius wrote that in 65 BC Caesar tried to get command in Egypt assigned to him by the plebeian council when Ptolemy XIIa Roman ally, was deposed by a rebellion in Alexandriabut the optimates blocked the assignment.
He was opposed by his colleague and both voluntarily laid down their offices. Plutarch wrote that when Caesar was allocated the governorship of the Roman province of Hispania Ulterior for 60 BC he was in debt and his creditors prevented him from going to his province.
Crassus paid off the most intransigent creditors and gave a surety of talents, thereby permitting Caesar to leave.
Marcus Licinius Crassus
Suetonius noted this episode as well, but did not mention who made the payments and gave the surety. In a speech Cicero made against an agrarian bill proposed by the plebeian tribune Publius Servilius Rullus in 63 BC, he claimed that Rullus was an insignificant figure and a front for unsavoury 'machinators' whom he described as the real architects of the bill and as the men who had the real power and who were to be feared.
He did not name these men, but he dropped hints that made them identifiable by saying, "Some of them to whom nothing appears sufficient to possess, some to whom nothing seems sufficient to squander. Moreover, Caesar had supported the Manilian law of 66 BC, which gave Pompey the command of the final phase of the Third Mithridatic War and, in 63 BC, as noted above, he proposed a motion to recall Pompey to Rome to restore order in the wake of the Catalinarian Conspiracy.
Therefore, Caesar was willing to support Pompey because, although the latter was not a popularis, he was not an optimate either, making him a potential ally. Moreover, at the time of the creation of the first triumvirate, Pompey was at odds with the optimates. The suspension of his praetorship in 62 BC by the senate when he advocated the recall of Pompey had probably shown Caesar that his enemies had the means to marginalise him politically.
To attain the consulship Caesar needed the support of Pompey and Crassus who, besides being the two most influential men in Rome, did not belong to the optimates and were thus likely to be politically marginalised as well. Plutarch maintained that Caesar sought an alliance with both men because allying with only one of them could have turned the other against him and he thought that he could play them off against each other.
Crassus may also have had another reason—having to do with the equites —for joining an alliance against the optimates. Cicero noted that in 60 BC Crassus advocated for the equites and induced them to demand that the senate annul some contracts they had taken up in the Roman province of Asia in today's western Turkey at an excessive price.
The equites equestrians were a wealthy class of entrepreneurs who constituted the second social order in Rome, just below the patricians. Many equites were publicanicontractors who acted as suppliers for the army and construction projects which they also oversaw and as tax collectors.
The state auctioned off the contracts for both suppliers and tax collectors to private firms, which had to pay for them in advance. The publicani had overextended themselves and fell into debt. Cicero thought that these contracts had been taken up in the rush for competition and that the demand was disgraceful and a confession of rash speculation.
Nevertheless, he supported the annulment to avoid the equites becoming alienated with the senate and to maintain harmony between patricians and equites. However, his goals were frustrated when the proposal was opposed by the consul Quintus Caecilius Celer and Cato the Younger and subsequently rejected, leading Cicero to conclude that the equites were now at loggerheads with the senate.
The most controversial measure Caesar introduced was an agrarian bill to allot plots of land to the landless poor for farming, which encountered the traditional conservative opposition.
In Cassius Dio's opinion, Caesar tried to appear to promote the interests of the optimates as well as those of the people, and said that he would not introduce his land reform if they did not agree with it. He read the draft of the bill to the senate, asked for the opinion of each senator and promised to amend or scrap any clause that had raised objections.
The optimates were annoyed because the bill, to their embarrassment, could not be criticised. They became lifelong allies. However, Crassus and Pompey disliked each other. Crassus was never really popular with the voters and he had difficulty earning the love and respect of the Roman people despite the fact that he came from a prominent, popular family because of his antisocial personality.
By contrast, Pompey and Caesar were very charismatic and likeable. While he was a good public orator and a military commander, he was no match for Pompey and Caesar in these two spheres of activity and he struggled to live up to comparison with these exceptional individuals. And because of this reason, he was jealous of them. Crassus seems to be a greedy and very ambitious man just as Pompey and Caesar were.
He always wanted power and money and military glory and he was willing to do whatever it took to acquire them. He was also an opportunistic and disloyal person. While Sulla was in power and while he was alive, Crassus pretended to be his loyal servant in order to advance his career and achieve his personal goals.
Crassus shared the consulship with Pompey a few times. Because the two were consuls together, they had intense rivalry. Crassus tried hard to surpass Pompey. Crassus was insecure about his position in the consulship. He was afraid that Pompey might become more powerful and overshadow him. Most of them utterly failed. He got a law passed through the senate which granted him the power of land distribution.
So they became dependent on Crassus for their wellbeing.